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Abstract 
The nexus between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is well researched and 
established in literature. However, the debate regarding the influence corporate governance exerts on corporate 
social responsibility engagements and reporting is still inconclusive.  This study investigates the impact of CG 
mechanisms on CSR disclosure among the listed companies in Botswana. The study employs content analysis to 
extract relevant data from annual reports for period 2014 to 2017. Comprehensiveness of descriptions of entity 
engagements in community involvement, human resources, environment and product and consumers is used as 
dependent variable while board size, board meeting frequency, ratio of independent directors to board size, the 
size of audit committee and its meeting frequency are used as independent variables. Company size and Return on 
assets are controlling variables. Least square regression method is used to analyse the effect of CG attributes on 
CSR disclosures. Comprehensiveness of disclosure is measured by sentences of reporting, availability of 
comparative figures, presence of photos and quantified CSR descriptions. The results suggest that the board size, 
board independence and audit committee meetings frequency have a statistically significant positive influence on 
corporate social responsibility reports. Company size also reflected a significant positive association with CSR 
disclosure. These results have implications on composition and structure of the board of directors which should be 
accorded due attention as the firms work to improve responsiveness to their stakeholders’ demands through CSR 
investments and disclosures. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is concerned with redirecting the business’ attention from the traditional 
sole motive of profit-maximization for shareholders (creating value for shareholders) to a broader focus embracing 
the interests of both the shareholders and other stakeholders.  Akinleye and Adedayo (2018) note that CSR is a 
business approach that contributes to sustainable development by delivering economic, social and environmental 
benefits for both the firms and their stakeholders.  Through CSR activities businesses show their commitment to 
contribute towards solving common social and environmental problems. Hohnen (2007) describes CSR as the way 
firms integrate social, environmental and economic concerns into their values, culture, decision making, strategy 
and operations in a transparent and accountable manner and thereby establish better practices within the firm, 
create wealth and improve society. Hence CSR has become an integral part of contemporary business model as it 
has become apparent to corporation’s management that their businesses can only flourish when the communities 
and ecosystem they operate in are healthy. Engaging in CSR in its various forms has become a win-win situation 
whereby socially and environmentally conscious stakeholders (consumers and employees) remain attracted to the 
company thereby improving company’s performance. From its genesis the key philosophy of CSR has been a 
voluntary involvement to align the business activities with society expectations (Benabou & Tirole, 2010).  
The concept of CSR does not only end at engaging in socially and environmentally preferable activities but 
businesses should be and be seen to be transparent and accountable about the impact of those activities on 
employees, communities and environment. This is achieved through a variety of outlets including annual reports, 
standalone reports and advertisements in the firms’ websites.  CSR reporting is described by Gray, Owen and 
Adam (1996) as the process of communicating the social and environmental effects of organisations’ economic 
activities on particular interested groups within society. Moravcikova, Stefanikova and Rypakova (2015) add that 
in essence CSR reporting is a process of providing comprehensive reports involving not only economic data, but 
also information from environmental and social field. Ackers (2014) appreciates that as benefits accruing from 
wider company disclosures became more and more apparent CSR reporting increased in extent and quality. Blasco 
and King (2017) report a high rate (60%) of CSR reporting in all industry sectors around the globe.  Corporate 
Social responsibility Reporting is said to have a positive effect on stakeholders’ beliefs about the company’s 
performance, value and risk, thus influencing company’s profitability, cost of capital and share price (Jizi, Salama, 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)  
Vol.10, No.20, 2019 
 
51 
Dixon & Stratling, 2014). In additions, comprehensive CSR disclosure is credited with lessening information 
asymmetry between managers and stakeholders particularly equity holders and thereby assisting in the supervision 
and control of managers. Woodward, Edwards and Birkin, (1996) point out that CSR disclosure can enhance 
corporate reputation through gaining trust and support by various stakeholders. Given the array of benefits accruing 
to companies due to CSR disclosure Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath (2008) contend that the board of directors are 
expected to promote CSR disclosure.  
The concept of CSR has expanded the basis of corporate performance whereby social, environmental and 
ethical aspects have been popularised and being evaluated along with financial results.  Jamali and Rabbath (2007) 
argue that as the multiple bottom-line performance attributes are gaining popularity companies are pressured to 
reconsider their strategies and objectives and to integrate new societal, environmental and ethical concerns in their 
operations. The role of big corporations is no longer limited to contributing to global economy but rather to 
reconcile and skilfully balance bottom line and manage the interests of multiple stakeholders (Lantos, 2001). 
Jamali and Rabbath (2007) add that this is where the concepts of corporate governance (CG) and CSR converge. 
 
1.2 Corporate Governance as a concept 
Cheffins (2015) attributes the rise of the corporate governance concept to growing division between share 
ownership and managerial control, inadequacies in managerial accountability and shareholders indifferences. Thus 
corporate governance emerged to protect and advance shareholders’ interests. The concept emerged in 1970s in 
the US and became popular in public companies in the early 1990s with the publication of 1992 Cadbury Report 
in the UK and the 1994 King I Report in South Africa. Both reports provided recommendations for improving 
company board structures in order to alleviate corporate governance risks and failures. Despite its longevity the 
corporate governance concept has not received a commonly acceptable definition (Claessens, 2003). Cadbury 
defines corporate governance as the systems by which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 2000, 
p.8).Wright (2014) as cited by Cheffins (2015) views corporate governance as  the process that encompasses the 
checks and balances affecting those who run companies. From the perspective of shareholders supremacy, Page 
(2005) views corporate governance through the lenses of power and responsibility of decision making in the 
organisation and broadly describes it as consisting of the legal, contractual, and implicit frameworks that define 
the exercise of power within a company, that influence decision making, that allow the stakeholders to assume 
their responsibilities, and that ensure that their rights and privileges are respected (Page, 2005, p.2). The World 
Bank (2005) stresses that whether a broad or narrow perspective is taken in defining corporate governance it is 
important that the fundamental values of transparency, accountability, fairness, and responsibility be respected in 
order for firms to build and sustain the confidence of investors, stakeholders, and society as a whole. 
Corporate governance is viewed as a critical condition for equitable and effective allocation of resources in 
both private and public sectors of the economy. Cadbury in Claessens (2003) opines that it is only when principles 
of fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility, which are key pillars of corporate governance, have 
been widely applied equitable and efficient allocation of resources can be achieved. Earlier on Cadbury in the 
foreword in Iskander and Chamlou (2000) had argued that adherence to corporate governance standards benefits 
both private and public sector entities. According to Iskander and Chamlou (2000) compliance with standards 
helps the private sector entities to achieve their corporate aims and attract investments; and assists the states to 
strengthen the economy and discourage fraud and mismanagement. The authors further note that good corporate 
governance is a source of competitive advantage and essential for economic and social progress. It attracts both 
foreign and local investors as decisions to invest are not only based on company’s outlook but also on its reputation 
and its governance. Oman and Blume (2005) assert that good governance is now accepted as vital to achieving the 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals and as a pre-requisite for sustainable economic growth. 
 
1.3 Relationship between Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
The relationship between CG and CSR has always been reflected in various definitions of corporate governance 
as they underscore the need for the boards of directors to strive to balance the interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders in their decision making. Claessens (2003) points out that corporate governance should extend to the 
issue of corporate social responsibility, including such aspects as the dealings of the firm with respect to culture 
and the environment. Cadbury in the foreword of the work of Iskander and Chamlou (2000)  notes that corporate 
governance is about holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal 
goals. Gill (2008) opine that in modern businesses corporate governance is being associated more and more with 
business practices that are stakeholder-friendly.  
Millstein as cited by World Bank (2005, p.5) defines corporate governance as “that blend of law, regulation 
and appropriate voluntary private sector practices which enables the corporation to attract financial and human 
capital, perform efficiently and thereby perpetuate itself by generating long term economic value for its 
shareholders, while respecting the interests of stakeholders and society as a whole.” Iskander and Chamlou (2000) 
emphasize that CG is about maximising value subject to meeting the corporation’s financial and other legal and 
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contractual obligations. This accentuated the need for board of directors to balance the interests of shareholders 
with those of other stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, investors, communities in order to 
achieve long-term sustained value for the corporations. King II Report (2009) when underlining the importance of 
sustainability principle of corporate governance stated that nature, society, and business are interconnected in 
complex ways that should be understood by decision-makers. Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath (2008) highlight 
that both CG and CSR require companies to fulfil their fiduciary and moral responsibilities towards their 
stakeholders. And are both perceived to command important long-lasting benefits and to assure the sustainability 
of the business. Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath (2008) perceive the relationship between CG and CSR from three 
dimensions.  The authors recognise that CG is a pillar for CSR, CSR is an attribute of CG and CG and CSR are 
co-existing components of the same continuum.  
 
1.4 Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility in Botswana. 
In an effort to enhance corporate governance practices in the country, Botswana introduced Botswana Corporate 
Governance Code (BCGC) in 2013 (Josiah, Themba & Matenge, 2016; Magang & Kube, 2018). The code was 
preceded by Botswana Stock Exchange Code of Best Practice whose main principles were retained in the new 
code. In pursuance of its mandate to promote high standards of corporate governance and compliance with 
professional ethics,  Botswana Accountancy Oversight Authority (BAOA), in 2016 directed public companies in 
Botswana to adopt South African King Report as the best corporate governance model. BAOA asserts that after 
conducting a comprehensive research it found that King Reports which are adopted on the “apply or explain” basis 
are more suitable to Botswana since they are more flexible and all-encompassing and are akin with Botswana Code 
of CG. Strong economic ties existing between Botswana and South Africa whereby 70% of the former’s imports 
come from the latter and a large number of South African companies participating in various sectors of Botswana’s 
economy (Seitshiro, 2016; Magang and Kube, 2018) could have been a catalyst for BAOA directive. Consequently 
a good number of public companies in Botswana make reference of their compliance with King III Report in their 
annual reports. Also at the time of conducting this study a mention of King IV Report adoption was starting to 
emerge in Botswana public companies’ corporate governance reports. However, BAOA cautions that Botswana 
public entities are only expected to adopt corporate governance principles that meet the minimum requirements of 
King Reports without necessarily adopting the Codes themselves (Botswana Accountancy Oversight Authority, 
2016) 
Firms from both private and public sectors in Botswana seem to have a strong belief in the importance of 
giving back to the community through CSR initiatives especially those focusing on community involvement. And 
prior studies in the country have provided evidence of the apparent existence of CSR activities and their disclosures 
among the Botswana business entities. See for example Mbekomize and Dima (2013) about CSR and CSRD in 
State owned entities and listed companies and Botshabelo, Mbekomize and Phatshwane (2018) on CSR and CSRD 
in Commercial banks. Despite the recognisable spread of CSR initiatives and reporting about the same in Botswana 
the practice is still mainly voluntary since currently there is no specific legislation compelling firms to engage in 
and report about CSR activities. However, there are sentiments among the public that the unregulated undertaking 
of the philanthropic actions may be abused. Consequently, there have been calls for CSR policy in Botswana aimed 
at standardising the CSR initiatives and curbing the tendencies of providing the same with intention of scoring 
personal gains. 
 
2. Problem Statement 
Despite the established link between CG and CSR as depicted in Hancock (2005) and supported by Elkington 
(2006), Jizi, Salama, Dixon and Stratling (2014) contend that there is still not enough research into the impact of 
CG on CSR globally. Although recently the studies examining the impact that corporate governance mechanisms 
can have on CSR engagements and disclosure have been on the increase most of these studies are still confined in 
the developed world (See for example, Aguilera and Williams, 2006; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Bear, Rahman 
and Post, 2010; Gill, 2008; and Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Moreover, prior studies results are still inconclusive 
regarding which board characteristics influence the extent and quality of CSR disclosure. The current study intends 
to contribute to literature which investigates the effect of CG characteristics on the level of CSR disclosure from 
the developing country perspective. 
 
3. Objectives 
The primary objective of this study is to determine the impact of key features of CG on CSRD. In order to achieve 
the general objective this study will focus on the following specific objectives: 
1. To determine the effect of board size on CSRD. 
2. To determine the effect of frequency of board meetings on CSRD  
3. To determine the effect of Board Independence on CSRD 
4. To determine the effect of audit committee size on CSRD  
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5. To determine the effect of frequency of audit committee meetings on CSRD 
 
4. Literature Review 
4.1 Theoretical framework 
From the corporate governance perspective this study is informed by agency theory; and from corporate social 
responsibility view point the study is hinged on legitimacy theory, stakeholders’ theory and institutional theory. 
While agency theory focuses on explaining the relationship between the owners and managers of firms the other 
three concentrate on explaining the firm’s motive for CSR disclosure practices (see for example, Kiyanga, Wingard 
and Cronje, 2016; Ruangviset, Jiraporn and Kim, 2014; Khan, Muttakin and Siddiqui, 2013; Ali, Sandhu, Iqbal 
and Tufail, 2016).   
4.1.1 Agency theory  
Agency theory has been a dominant theory of explaining organisational relationships in corporations characterised 
by separation of ownership and control (Roberts, 2004; Elhabib, Rasid, Basiruddin, 2014). Agency theory suggests 
that the agent should work to serve the interests of the principal. In contemporary large corporations the 
shareholders (owners) are the principals and the managers serve as agents who are expected to work for the 
interests of principals while disregarding their self-interests. However, this has not been always the case as agents 
tend to heighten their interests at the expense of the principals’. According to Berle and Means (1932) separation 
of ownership and control generates goals incongruences between the interests of managers and those of owners 
creating agency problem. Roberts (2004) adds that the combination of managers’ assumed autonomy and self-
interested motivation creates the problem within agency relationships. Therefore, practitioners as well as 
academicians have been preoccupied with developing different governance mechanisms which may ensure 
effective corporate control to cause managers to always act in the best interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Bonazzi and Islam, 2007). The authors assert that among the many mechanisms that have been 
advocated to direct corporate managers at enhancing shareholders value, designing an effective board of directors 
has remained vital and feasible option.  This view is supported by Elhabib, Rasid and Basiruddin, (2015) who 
highlight that various definitions of corporate governance are centred on managing and controlling the relationship 
between corporate managers and equity owners in order to mitigate the negative impact of the agency conflict. 
Roberts (2004) has a view that if board of directors have to succeed to align managers’ desires with those of 
shareholders the boards must be dominated by independent non-executive directors who have clear specific roles; 
the role of the non-executive chairman must be separated from the role of chief executive and board subcommittees 
should have members who come from independent non-executive cohort. In addition to the aforementioned 
internal controls, external controls in the form of financial performance and social and environmental disclosures 
should be enhanced in order to improve monitoring of executives’ performance. This study investigates the impact 
of board of directors’ attributes on corporate social responsibility disclosure which is one of the strategies 
corporations use to enhance stakeholders value (Akinleye & Adedayo, 2018). 
4.1.2 Legitimacy theory 
For the most part of the period of its existence since 1970s corporate social and environmental reporting has been 
voluntary (Jupe, 2005; Tilt, 2009, van der Laan, 2009) although some efforts to make the disclosure standardised 
and mandatory have been made (Yongvanich & Guthrie, 2006; KPMG, 2005). The voluntary nature of CSR 
initiatives and disclosure spurred researchers to develop keen interests in investigating the reasons behind. 
Legitimacy theory, stakeholders’ theory and institutional theory are among the frequently cited theories to explain 
voluntary disclosure of non-financial performance (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). 
Legitimacy theory holds that no organisation has an inherent right to exist but that any business operation 
owes its existence to a greater acceptance approved by society (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). Tilling (2004) points out 
that according to legitimacy theory the society has the power to grant or deny the business entity the right to operate. 
Therefore, the legitimacy of the business entity is threatened whenever the society does not perceive the business 
operations as being congruent to society expectations. Deegan (2002) adds that a business entity needs to have 
legitimacy as a social licence to function. According to Suchman (1995, p574) “Legitimacy is a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. The main purposes of pursuing legitimacy are to 
facilitate the attraction of economic resources and to gain social and political support (Suchman, 1995; Ogden & 
Clarke, 2005).Tilling (2004) argues that legitimacy is a resource that a business entity requires in order to operate 
successfully. It may be increased or decreased by certain actions. Therefore through some actions an organisation 
can go through stages of establishing, maintaining, extending or defending legitimacy. In the broader context of 
economic theory whereby the business entity takes certain actions to avoid some costs, legitimacy theory argues 
that business entities disclosure practices are a means of establishing or defending legitimacy to influence public 
opinion or policy (Tilt and Symes, 2000). The business need to appear acting within the bounds of what society 
deems to be socially acceptable behaviour since being legitimate attracts resources essential for survival (Jupe, 
2005, Tilt, 2009).  
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Voluntary CSRD has been frequently used as a legitimation strategy. Patten (1992) indicate that extent of 
corporate responsibility disclosure increases when the firm faces environmental or social difficulties such as 
environmental pollution or human rights violation. The company will use different media outlets and increase 
amount of information in order to defend its legitimacy.  
O’Donovan (2002) as cited by Siddique (2009) examined the environmental disclosures in the annual reports 
of environmental sensitive Australian Companies with a view of establishing the relationship between a potentially 
legitimacy threatening issue with managers’ choice of legitimation tactics and thus determine the predictive power 
of legitimacy theory. O’Donovan concluded that environmental disclosure decisions were made on the basis of 
presenting the corporation positively to the society.   
Lupu and Sandu (2010) analysed legitimacy strategies in a recently privatised oil company in Romania  and 
found out that as the social conflict about privatisation intensified there was a corresponding increase in moral 
legitimacy strategies especially around community involvement activities. Jupe (2005) analysed corporate 
environmental reports of 200 UK companies and found that legitimacy theory was an explanatory factor for the 
environmental reports. 
4.1.3 Stakeholder theory  
Stakeholder theory suggests that organisations should be managed in the interests of all their constituents, not only 
in the interests of shareholders (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Stakeholder theory is an extension of legitimacy 
theory in the sense that it proposes the focus on stakeholders with interest in the business instead of the society at 
large. It calls for integrating stakeholders concerns into business process. Stakeholder theory is a branch of social 
and political theories which suggests that business disclosures are a response to competing pressure from different 
stakeholders such as governments, employees, environmental groups, customers, creditors, suppliers and the 
public (Adler and Milne 1997). The stakeholder theory recognises the existence of various groups of stakeholders 
with different power to affect the organisation, different legitimacy relationship with the organisation and different 
urgency of claims from the organisation. The organisation will respond to the influence, legitimacy or claim of 
each cohort of stakeholders depending on how management assesses the importance of each attribute (Mitchell, 
Agle & Wood, 1997). Due to the importance of stakeholders in the survival of the company CSRD has been one 
of the strategies of maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. Nikolova and Arsić, (2017) assert that 
increased CSR makes business establishments more attractive to stakeholders, and as such enterprises should 
engage in CSR ventures. 
4.1.4. Institutional theory  
Institutional theory recognizes that the institutional environment can strongly influence the development of formal 
structures in an organization. It underscores the concept that the forms, outcomes and dynamics of firms are 
influenced by other social institutions (Brammer, Jackson & Matten (2012). According to institutional theorists 
organisations tend to follow the formal structures and procedures that are valued in their social and cultural 
environment in order to achieve legitimacy and to secure the resources that are essential for their survival 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Katsikas, 2017).  
From CSRD view point Dagiliene (2014) identifies four factors affecting the firm’s practices namely 
mandatory factors, normative factors, economic factors and copying factors. Mandatory factors refer to formal and 
informal impact of public authorities and other social forces. Normative factors refer to the effect of professional 
organisations that set standards and principles of CSR reporting that firms have to comply with. Economic factors 
refer to forces emanating from the idea of economic changes which spark companies to disclose non-financial 
performances to existing and potential investors. Copying factors means tendency of companies to behave in 
similar manner as their flourishing counterparts (motivated to engage in CSR disclosure because your successful 
counterpart is doing it).  
Dagiliene (2014) opine that mandatory and normative institutional factors mostly affect the development of 
CSRD in business companies due to consistent improvement of sustainability methodologies from organisations 
such as Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), OECD and UNHC. Brammer, Jackson & Matten (2012) add that 
corporate agency is largely shaped by the dominant institutions of the business systems or organisational field 
within which the firm operates. They further expound that in the context of Anglo-Saxon context, the influence of 
organisational field may result in mostly voluntary policies and programmes of CSR while in other countries like 
Japan and Germany CSR may be shaped by legal, customary or religious institutions. Drawing from extant 
literature on CSR, Brammer, Jackson & Matten (2012) argue that given the wide variations in CSR practices and 
dynamics in the concept and its applications, motives for CSR are broader than managers’ voluntary responses to 
society or stakeholders expectations. 
 
4.2 Empirical CG and CSR 
Khan, Muttakin and Siddiqui (2013) analysed the relationship between corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility in Bangladeshi companies. They analysed the contents of annual reports using legitimacy theory 
lens. The independent variables used included managerial ownership, public ownership, foreign ownership, board 
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independence, CEO duality, and existence of audit committee. The dependent variables were represented by the 
corporate governance characteristics. The control variables used were percentage of share owned by the directors, 
percentage of shares owned by the public and percentage of shares owned by foreign investors. Others included 
firm’s size measured as natural logarithm of total assets, the number of years the company has been in existence, 
ratio of total debt to total assets and profitability measured as return on total assets. The dependent variable (CSRD) 
was measured using the CSR disclosure index.  Khan, Muttakin and Siddiqui (2013) results indicate a significant 
positive association between CSRD with managerial ownership especially among export-oriented entities. The 
results also reveal that public ownership, foreign ownership, board independence and existence of audit committee 
have a positive significant effect on disclosure of corporate social responsibility. The authors concluded that 
corporate governance characteristics play an important role in ensuring organisational legitimacy through CSRD. 
Jizi, Salama, Dixon and Stratling (2014) examined the impact of corporate governance on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure in US banking sector. With respect to corporate governance they used board 
independence, board size, CEO duality as independent variables. They measured the quality and 
comprehensiveness of the corporate social responsibility disclosures using four themes of community involvement, 
environment, employees and social products and services quality. In addition, corporate governance variables that 
are expected to influence CSRD were brought in as control variables and they included firm size, financial 
expertise and meetings frequency of audit committee. Others included frequency of meetings of board of directors, 
company profitability measured as return on assets, company leverage, company’s systematic risk and company 
size. Jizi, Salama, Dixon and Stratling (2014) found that board independence and board size were positively and 
significantly associated with CSR disclosure and CEO duality had a positive and significant effect on CSR 
disclosure. 
Ali, Sandhu, Iqbal and Tufail (2016) investigated the effect of corporate governance characteristics on CSRD 
in Pakistan companies and found that only the multiple directorships of a chairperson had a significant positive 
relationship with CSRD. Existence of non-executive directors on the board and presence of non-executive directors 
in the audit committee did not reflect a significant relationship with CSR. The authors therefore concluded that in 
Pakistan companies corporate governance mechanisms carry no weight in driving the CSR reporting agenda. 
Employing document analysis on the sample from Lebanon companies, Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath (2008) 
investigated the nature of relationship between CG and CSR and found that in most cases CG was a critical 
component for sustainable CSR.  
Adnan, Van Staden and Hay (2009) examined the influence of culture and corporate governance structure on 
quality of CSRD in companies operating in China, India, Malaysia and United Kingdom. The quality of CSR 
disclosure as a dependent variable was measured using the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) Index. The 
independent variables were corporate governance and culture. The former was measured using board composition 
and existence of CSR committee on the board while the later was represented by individualism, power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity index.  Control variables included CSR assurance statement, being audited 
by big-four auditors, ISO1400 certification and countries’ environmental performance. The results of Adnan, Van 
Staden and Hay (2009) work suggested that the quality of information in CSR standalone reports and website was 
better than that disclosed in the annual reports. The CSRD quality was different across countries. The study also 
submit that social and environmental information was less likely to be disseminated through annual reports since 
they focus on the shareholders who are normally interested in economic performance rather than social and 
environmental performance. Ruangviset, Jiraporn and Kim ( 2014) used the USA data for the period 2001 to 2004 
to examine the relationship between CG and CSRD and found a negative relationship between  them.  
 
5.Methodology 
The target population for this study was 23 listed domestic companies in the Botswana Stock Exchange. However, 
due to various reasons such as delisting and new listings within the period of 4 years under review and lack of 
involvement in CSR and/or non-disclosure by certain firms, particularly those from property sector, we ended up 
analysing 11 firms. Sources of information for analysis were annual reports for the period 2014 to 2017. Although 
CSR engagements are nowadays reported using different media such as standalone statements, company websites 
and advertisements, annual reports have been a dominant channel due to their advantages over the other outlets. 
With annual reports corporate disclosures are easily comparable from year to year and the reporting company has 
more editorial control (Lavers, 1993). The annual reports are considered to be the main document used by various 
stakeholders to make a variety of decisions (Deegan & Rankin, 1997; Jizi, Salama, Dixon & Stratling, 2014). We 
however note that the work by Adnan, Van Staden and Hay (2009) indicated that CSR standalone and websites 
reports provide higher quality information than annual reports.  
The wide usability and easy accessibility of annual reports of public companies in Botswana attracted us to 
confine ourselves to this medium. In line with prior studies (see for example Jizi, Salama, Dixon & Stratling, 2014; 
Adnan, Van Staden and Hay, 2009) content analysis was employed to extract the information regarding corporate 
social responsibility engagement and reporting which was divided in five categories namely community 
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involvement, environment, human resources, product and customers and general information for the easy 
identification of data of interest in the annual reports. The unit analysis for CSRD was the number of sentences 
reflecting activities in the above mentioned five themes.  The information about corporate governance attributes 
and control variables (board size, board meeting frequency, board independence, audit committee size and its 
meeting frequency) were also obtained from annual reports.  
Table 1: Measurement of study variables 
Variables  Abbreviation Measurements  




CSRD Combination of scores for number of sentences reporting CSR 
issues and dummy variables for presence or absence of photos, 
comparable figures and quantification of CSR activities. 
Independent Variables  and Measurement 
Board size BOZ Total number of persons serving in the board of directors 
Board meetings 
frequency  
BMF Number of board meetings held in a year 
Board independence BOI Ratio of total number of persons serving as independent board 
members relative to the total number of board members 
Audit committee size  ACZ Total number of directors in the audit committee  
Audit committee 
meetings frequency  
ACF Number of Audit committee meetings held in a year  
Control Variables 
Company size COZ Natural logarithm of total asset value 
Return on Assets ROA Ratio of profits before tax over total assets 
 
5.1 Dependent Variable 
The study aimed at determining the effect of the corporate governance mechanisms on comprehensiveness of CSR 
disclosure.  Therefore the comprehensiveness of CSR disclosure was the dependent variable for this study. Prior 
studies interested in examining what influences corporate disclosures have used different methods including 
measuring the extent of reporting using words or sentences describing the activities undertaken by companies (See 
Abu-Baker, 2000, Thompson & Zakaria, 2004, Rahman & Muttakin, 2005, Haniffa and Coke, 2005) or 
determining the quality and comprehensiveness of disclosures (See for example Adnan, Van Staden and Hay, 
2009 ;  Jizi, Salama, Dixon & Stratling, 2014). Of the two methods, quality and comprehensive of disclosures 
approach is considered to be more rigorous and therefore superior to using words, sentences or paragraphs. 
However, the quality of disclosures approach would generally suffer from being arbitrary than the extent approach 
as measures of quality may be difficult to determine adequately.  
In prior studies the tool used to measure quality of information has been the assigning of scores on information 
disclosed.  For example Adnan, Staden and Hay  (2009) used scores from  0 to 5  to measure the quality of 
information disclosed based on 51 items according to GRI Index while Jizi, Salama, Dixon and Stratling (2014)  
used scores from 1 to 5 depending on existence and comprehensiveness of information reported including existence 
of comparative and quantified  information. In this study we decided to use the number of sentences describing 
CSR engagements to measure comprehensiveness of disclosures. We are of the view that the more the company 
talks about a CSR theme the more the importance it attaches to that theme. The disclosure of photos, comparable 
figures and quantification of activities including the amount spent were considered to enhance the 
comprehensiveness of disclosure. 
Therefore after capturing company’s number of sentences per CSR category per year we totalled all the 
sentences from each category to make the sum of sentences for each year. We then sorted the totals of the 44 
observations from 11 firms which had a minimum of 21 and maximum of 815 sentences in the ascending order 
(from smallest to largest). After that we grouped the 44 observations in five categories of nine observations in each 
group except the upper group which had eight observations.  Then the five groups were assigned score as follows: 
Groups of  number of sentences  Scores 
21 to 50 1 
51 to 91 2 
92 to 144 3 
145 to 173 4 
174 to 815 5 
A comprehensive disclosure of photos, comparable figures and quantification of activities were each awarded 
one point while the absence of each was awarded a zero. What deserves one point or a zero was agreed upon by 
two principal investigators which were involved in extracting the information from annual reports. Therefore the 
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maximum scores for each company per year were 8 points. 
 
5.2 Independent variables 
Five Corporate governance attributes formed the independent variables to be regressed against CSRD 
comprehensiveness. They included board size (BOZ), board meeting frequency (BMF), board independence (BOI), 
audit committee size (ACZ) and frequency of meetings of audit committee (ACF). In line with prior studies we 
included controls variables to reflect additional variables that can increase the likelihood of firms to engage in 
CSR activities (Ruangviset, Jiraporn, Kim, 2014). Control variables were company size (COZ) measured as total 
assets and return on total assets (ROA) representing performance of the company. Company size has been said to 
influence the extent of CSR activities and disclosure (Damak-Ayadi, 2010). Large companies have greater impact 
and society and environment and are therefore subject to public attention and scrutiny (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2008). Although the association between CSR and corporate financial performance is still debatable some studies 
have concluded a positive and significant correlation between the two (Uadiale and Fagbemi, 2012; Adeneye and 
Ahmed, 2015). 
We formulated the linear regression model to explain the association between CSRD and CG attributes as follows: 
CSRD = α +β1 BOZ+ β2 BMF+ β3 BOI+ β4 ACZ+ β5 ACF + β6 COZ + β7 ROA+ ε 
Where  
CSRD = scores of comprehensives of corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
 α represents the value that CSRD will have when all independent variables are equal to zero.  
β1…. β7 = regression coefficients to be estimated representing the quantified effect that each corporate governance 
variable has on the corporate social responsibility disclosure 
ε is an error term 
 
6. Analysis and Discussion 
Table 2 shows that the mean scores for comprehensiveness of CSR disclosure among the sampled companies was 
around 4.5 points out of the maximum 8 points signifying that the quality of CSRD was around 56%. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CSRD comprehensiveness 44 1 8 4.48 2.118 
Board size 44 6 14 8.70 1.887 
Board meetings 44 3 8 4.39 1.243 
Board Independence 44 .11111 .88889 .5571410 .19520517 
Audit committee size 44 2 7 4.20 1.193 
Audit committee meetings 44 2 8 3.75 1.144 
Company size 44 11.558826 16.977238 14.47777614 1.692147464 
Return on Assets 44 -.01547 1.14815 .1503833 .18509118 
The number of board members in the sampled companies ranged between 6 and 14 with an average of around 
9 members. The board of directors in sampled companies had an average of about 4 meetings in year. The average 
ratio of independent members in the sampled boards of directors was around 56% signifying that the companies 
are properly managed. King III Principle 2.18 recommends that the majority of non-executive board members 
should be independent in order to achieve balance of power in the board (King Committee on Corporate 
Governance, & Institute of Directors (South Africa) (2009) 
The number of audit committee members ranged between 2 and 7 with an average of about 4 members and 
were meeting almost quarterly on average. Table 2 also reflects that the company size measured as natural 
logarithm of total assets value was between 11.558826 and 16.977238 with a mean of 14.47777614. For the 
sampled companies, the mean value of return on assets was 0.1504; the minimum was negative 0.01547 while the 
maximum was 1.14815. 
Table 3 reflects the correlation among the study variables. Among the five corporate governance mechanisms 
only size of board of directors has a significant and positive association with CSRD (r = 0.484; p = 0.001). Table 
3 also shows that among the control variables only company size has a significant and positive association with 
CSRD (r = 0.444; p = 0.003). 
Among the independent variables, board meeting frequency has a significant positive and strong relationship 
with audit committee meeting frequency (r = 0.691; p = 0.001). On average board of directors of companies in the 
sample have almost the same number of meetings in year like the audit committees reflecting the importance the 
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Table 3: Correlations among study variables 
 CSRD  BOZ BMF BOI ACZ ACF COZ 
BOZ Pearson Correlation .484** 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .001       
BMF Pearson Correlation .264 .089 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .083 .564      
BOI Pearson Correlation .272 -.182 .029 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .074 .236 .850     
ACZ  Pearson Correlation .172 -.055 .181 .391** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .264 .722 .240 .009    
ACF Pearson Correlation .271 -.154 .691** .019 .243 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .075 .320 .000 .905 .112   
COZ Pearson Correlation .444** -.051 .364* .284 .321* .418** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .744 .015 .062 .034 .005  
ROA Pearson Correlation -.019 .039 -.228 .067 -.117 -.267 -.530** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .902 .800 .137 .667 .451 .080 .000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Independence of the board of directors has a significant positive but weak correlation with audit committee 
size (r = 0.391; p = 0.009). Company size has a significant positive but moderate association with audit committee 
meeting frequency (r = 0.418, P =0.005); a significant positive but weak association with board meetings frequency 
(r = 0.364, p = 0.015) and audit committee size (r = 0.321, p = 0.034). Company size reflected a significant negative 
moderate association with return on assets (r = -0.530; p = 0.000).  
Table 4 reflects the results of multivariate regression analysis of comprehensiveness of CSRD. The model is 
good predictor of the comprehensiveness of CSRD with F = 7.947; p = 0.000 and adjusted R2  of 53.% implying 
that 53% fluctuations in the comprehensiveness of CSRD can be attributed to the combination of CG 
characteristics imbedded in the model. Consistent with prior studies, for example, Jizi, Salama, Dixon and Stratling 
(2014) and Barakat, Pérez and Ariza (2015), the results suggest that CSR disclosure is mainly driven by board size 
with standardised beta of 60.7% and p-value of 0.000 
Table 4: Regression Analysis of CSRD Model 




  Collinearity Statistics Model Summary ANOVA 











CSRD         .607 .531 7.947 .000b 
 (Constant) -12.461 2.617  -4.761 0.000       
 BOZ .681 .126 .607 5.387 .000 .861   
1.162 
    
 BMF -.226 .258 -.133 -.876 .387 .475 2.103     
 BOI 2.892 1.344 .267 2.151 .038 .711 1.406     
 ACZ -.134 .211 -.076 -.635 .529 .772 1.295     
 ACF .634 .295 .342 2.152 .038 .432 2.317     
 COZ .565 .180 .451 3.136 .003 .527 1.898     
 ROA 2.642 1.467 .231 1.800 .080 .664 1.506     
Among the five corporate governance mechanisms tested only board size had a significant positive 
association with CSRD at 1% level of significance. Audit committee meetings frequency and board independence 
had a significant positive but weak relationship with comprehensiveness of CSR disclosure at 0.05 level of 
significance, β = 0.342, p = 0.038 and β = 0.267, p = 0.038 respectively. Board meetings frequency and audit 
committee size reflected non-significant relationship with CSR disclosure. The results of the current study also 
suggest that company size has a significant positive impact on CSRD (β = 0.451, p = 0.003). These results are 
also supporting the numerous prior studies which suggest that company size has a significant influence of CSRD 
(see for example Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Sadou, Alom, and Laluddin, 2017; Ali, Sandhu, Iqbal and Tufail, 
2016). Another control variable, return on assets, did not appear to have significant impact on CSRD.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This study used the data obtained from annual reports of companies listed on Botswana stock exchange for the 
period 2014 to 2017 to examine the influence of CG characteristics on CSR disclosure. Overall, the results of this 
research suggest a moderate association between CG and CSR disclosure. Consistent with prior studies the results 
of this study provide evidence of the three CG characteristics namely, board size, board independence and audit 
committee meeting frequency, having a significant positive impact on the CSRD. Of the three, the size of the board 
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of directors has the most significant influence on CSRD. This implies that large boards which are normally 
associated with large firms bring in diverse ideas of how to respond to various stakeholders’ demands through 
corporate social responsibility activities. In light with legitimacy theory large boards would pay more attention to 
stakeholders’ claims and will respond to them through extra social and environmental activities and disclosures.  
The board consisting of majority of independent members is more likely to push for more CSR engagements as 
members may tend to have a better understanding of external stakeholders’ needs since that’s where they belong.  
In light with agency theory the larger the board size the more likely the board will act in congruence with 
stakeholders’ interests. Honesty and transparency of the firm through the corporate disclosures would be enhanced 
if the board size is properly aligned with the size of the firm. 
A worth noting observation has been made by this study in light of institutional theory which attributes the 
CSRD to practices found in organisational field in which the firm operates. This study noted a persistent lack of 
CSR investments and their disclosures in the property development and management sector firms. The reasons for 
this phenomenon are not clear but it may be assumed that firms in the property sector could be considering 
themselves operating in an industry which is not socially and environmental sensitive and therefore do not see the 
necessity of building their legitimacy through CSR investments. This could be an area where further empirical 
studies could be conducted to inquire from property company managers what could be the reasons behind lack of 
active CSR engagements and disclosure. 
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